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The Watchman Fell Asleep

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Examines how Israel was caught by surprise in the opening stages of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.Based on many formerly undisclosed intelligence and military documents, the secret protocols of discussio...
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  • 18 August 2005
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Examines how Israel was caught by surprise in the opening stages of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Based on many formerly undisclosed intelligence and military documents, the secret protocols of discussions on the eve of the war, and interviews with relevant figures, The Watchman Fell Asleep is a compelling account of Israel's intelligence failure before the 1973 Arab attack known as the Yom Kippur War. The Hebrew version of this book was awarded the Tshetshik Prize for Strategic Studies on Israel's Security in 2001, and the Israeli Political Science Association's Best Book Award in 2002. Available here in English for the first time, Uri Bar-Joseph has crafted an authoritative explanation of the most traumatic event in Israel's stormy history and one of the biggest strategic military surprises of the twentieth century.

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Price: £72.50
Pages: 328
Publisher: State University of New York Press
Imprint: SUNY Press
Series: SUNY series in Israeli Studies
Publication Date: 18 August 2005
Trim Size: 9.00 X 6.00 in
ISBN: 9780791464816
Format: Hardcover
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Acknowledgments
Introduction


Part I. The Egyptian War Decision and Its Implementation


1. The War Decision


2. Planning the Next War: Past Experience and the Main Problems


Problem I: The Crossing of the Canal
Problem II: Egyptian Air Inferiority
Problem III: Inferiority in Armored Fighting


3. The Egyptian Deception Plan


i. The Role of Deception in Egyptian War Planning
ii. Passive Deception
iii. Active Deception
iv. Assessment of the Egyptian Deception


4. The Egyptian-Syrian War Coordination


Part II. Israel Prepares for War


5. The Balance of Forces—the Israeli View


6. The Intelligence Conception and Its Sources


i. The Conception
ii. The Empirical Evidence


7. The Strategic Warning and Its Role in Israel’s War Plans


8. The Next War Scenarios


9. The War Estimate: October 1972–August 1973


i. October 1972–April 1973
ii. April–May 1973
iii. June–August 1973


Part III. The Dynamics of an Intelligence Fiasco


10. August–September 1973


11. Monday, October 1, 1973


12. Tuesday, October 2, 1973


13. Wednesday, October 3, 1973


14. Thursday, October 4, 1973


15. Friday, October 5, 1973


16. Saturday, October 6, 1973, 0400 –1400


17. Surprise


i. The Cabinet
ii. The Canal Front
iii. The Golan Front
iv. The Air Force


18. The Cost of Being Caught Unprepared


i. The Material Losses
ii. The Psychological Impact of Surprise


19. The Causes of the Intelligence Failure


i. Obstacles Unique to the Warning-Response Process
ii. Bureaucratic Obstacles
iii. Groupthinking
iv. Psychological Obstacles at the Individual Level
v. The Human Factor


Notes
Bibliography
Index