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Central to any interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is an understanding of his philosophical method and the nature of the turn which characterises the evolution from his early to his later work. In the essays in Wittgenstein, Scepticism and Naturalism, Marie McGinn argues that this methodological shift has at its heart a highly distinctive form of naturalism, which has its roots in the works of Goethe. This form of naturalism emphasises achieving a clarified view of complex, natural phenomena in their natural setting, with a view to describing patterns and connections that are in plain view. Wittgenstein is seen as applying these methods to the task of conceptual clarification, whose aim is to dissolve philosophical problems and paradoxes. The essays cover the following topics: scepticism about the external world; scepticism about other minds; knowledge and belief; meaning and rule-following; psychological states and the distinctive first-person use of psychological concepts; the relation between the early and the later philosophy; and the nature of Wittgenstein’s naturalism.
This book brings together 11 papers by Marie McGinn—written between 1998 and 2014—all of which concern Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Engaging in fruitful and original ways with many central topics in Wittgenstein's scholarship, they cannot but stimulate any reader to pause and think about the issues concerned. On the whole, the essays may be seen as articulating an overarching view, revolving around McGinn's ascription to Wittgenstein of a ‘highly distinctive form of naturalism’ (vii),1 which she ties to Wittgenstein's remark that ‘what we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings’ (PI, §415). This naturalism does not concern nature as it appears ‘in the controlled and artificial conditions of the laboratory experiment’ (128), but nature is the environment in which our daily lives are embedded - Philosophical Investigations 2022; Scepticism and Naturalism: Essays on the Later Philosophy Marie McGinn, Wittgenstein; Wim Vanrie Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Preface; Acknowledgements; Works by Wittgenstein; Chapter One Wittgenstein on Certainty; Chapter Two The Real Problem of Others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein on Scepticism about Other Minds; Chapter Three The Everyday Alternative to Scepticism: Cavell and Wittgenstein on Other Minds; Chapter Four Wittgenstein and Knowledge; Chapter Five Wittgenstein and Williamson on Knowing and Believing; Chapter Six Wittgenstein and Moore’s Paradox; Chapter Seven Wittgenstein and Naturalism; Chapter Eight Naturalism and ‘Turning Our Whole Inquiry Around’; Chapter Nine Liberal Naturalism: Wittgenstein and McDowell; Chapter Ten ‘Recognizing the Ground That Lies before Us as Ground’: McDowell on How to Read the Philosophical Investigations; Chapter Eleven Grammar in the Philosophical Investigations; References; Index.