This study examines remote shareholder resolutions in German and French company law from a comparative legal perspective. It focuses on the tension between three core shareholder interests: flexibility in decision-making, protection of participation rights, and legal certainty of resolutions. The central premise is that both legal systems face comparable challenges arising from digitalization, yet have developed different legal approaches that may serve as mutual sources of inspiration for legal reform and harmonization. The analysis follows a functional comparative method and is structured according to the degree of contractual freedom within the respective company forms. It examines companies with broad organizational flexibility - in particular the German civil-law partnership (GbR), the société civile, the limited liability company (GmbH), and the société à responsabilité limitée - as well as companies subject to stricter statutory regulation, such as the stock corporation (AG), the société anonyme, the partnership limited by shares (KGaA), and the société en commandite par actions. For each company form, the study addresses direct and indirect resolution procedures, defects in resolutions, and special rules introduced during the pandemic. The study demonstrates that both legal systems often arrive at comparable outcomes while relying on different doctrinal approaches. French law proves in some respects to be more advanced from a regulatory perspective, particularly regarding digital participation in shareholders' meetings and the reformed law on defective resolutions. The work also develops concrete proposals for the harmonization of digital company law.