The book critiques positions argued for or assumed by Kripke, developing a largely Wittgensteinian philosophical position. Kripke’s views have shaped analytic philosophy for more than half a century, many becoming common orthodoxy. Ben-Yami, by contrast, criticizes and rejects many central ones. Rigidity of names, if maintained, should be significantly revised; the causal or communication picture of names is rejected; identity is contingent, as is the origin of things; the meaning of kind terms is not a function of any unknown essence; Kripke has failed to provide any example of necessary a posteriori knowledge or to support the concept of metaphysical necessity; his approach to the liar paradox is mistaken; he failed to understand Wittgenstein on rule following; and more. A different approach to logic, language, metaphysics, and philosophy emerges as the book’s critical reflections accumulate.