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International Relations under Risk

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Argues that international relations ought to be anchored in realistic models of human decision making.The field of international relations is only now beginning to take notice of cognitive models o...
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  • 03 August 2004
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Argues that international relations ought to be anchored in realistic models of human decision making.

The field of international relations is only now beginning to take notice of cognitive models of decision making. Arguing against the trend of adopting formalistic depictions of human choice, Berejikian suggests that international relations and realistic models of human decision making go hand-in-hand. The result is a set of interconnected propositions that provide compelling new insights into state behavior. Utilizing this framework, he discusses the behavior of the United States and Europe in negotiating the Montreal Protocol, a landmark international agreement designed to save the earth's protective ozone shield.

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Price: £72.50
Pages: 166
Publisher: State University of New York Press
Imprint: SUNY Press
Series: SUNY series in Global Politics
Publication Date: 03 August 2004
ISBN: 9780791460078
Format: Hardcover
BISACs:

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


1. COMPETING MODELS OF DECISION MAKING


Introduction
Cognition and International Relations Theory
Prospect Theory
Assessment
Chapter Summary


2. PROSPECT THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS


Introduction
Arguments against Prospect Theory
Prospect Theory and the Study of International Relations
Conclusion


3. THE USE OF POWER


Introduction
Status Quo, Subjectivity, and Decision Frames
Power and Coercion
Military Deterrence
Economic Threats
Two-Level Economic Threat Model
The Failure of Sanctions
Conclusion

4. COOPERATION


Introduction
Propositions on Negotiation and Cooperation
Cooperation and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Is Cooperation Risky or Safe?
Strategic Choice
Cooperation and the Tragedy of the Commons
Conclusion


5. A UNIFIED THEORY OF PREFERENCES


Introduction
The Gains Debate
The Problem of Fixed Preferences
Constructivism and the Gains Debate
Unifying Preferences
Power, Preferences, and Strategies
Conclusion


6. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY


Background
Foreign Policy in a Community
The Decision Frame Prior to Vienna
Negotiating at Vienna: 1982–1985
Relative or Absolute Gains?
The Formation of a Losses Frame
The European Gamble
Conclusion


7. THE UNITED STATES


Background
Banning CFCs Prior to a Decision Frame
American Passivity
The Alliance for CFCs
An Inadvertent Losses Frame
The Move to Multilateralism: Vienna and Montreal
Conclusion


8. CONCLUSIONS


Preferences and Frames
Realism and Cooperation
Risk Acceptance, Cooperation, and Regime Design
Power, Leverage, and Domestic Win-Sets
The "Ozone Hole"
The Promise of a Cognitive Research Program


NOTES


REFERENCES


SERIES LIST


INDEX