Dogmatics constitutes the characteristic mode of communication in German(-language) legal scholarship in general and in constitutional law scholarship in particular. Its strength lies in its focus on the needs of legal practice. Yet this practical orientation comes at a price, as it more or less inevitably leads to the exclusion, reduction, or neglect of non-dogmatic approaches to understanding the law. Against this background, the question arises whether legal scholarship in general and constitutional law scholarship in particular possess - and require - additional disciplinary "languages" beyond the classical foundational disciplines of legal history, legal philosophy, and legal sociology in order to communicate beyond the sphere of legal application and to adequately grasp the legal world more broadly. Particular attention should be paid here to constitutional theory, which, while clearly connected to (constitutional) dogmatics, cannot be reduced to it but instead points beyond it. In this way, constitutional theory could serve as a mediator between dogmatics and the classical foundational disciplines. The French example likewise helps to illuminate both the strengths of the "language model" of German(-language) constitutional law scholarship and its need for supplementation.