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Increased international interdependence - globalization - has also greatly increased the potential for international conflict in various areas such as trade, competition, the environment, and human rights. Observers have counted up to 40 international courts that serve to settle such conflicts. What are adequate criteria to measure the effectiveness of international courts? What factors explain the differences in their success? What factors explain the differences of nation-state governments in delegating competence to international courts in the first place? Should there be any additional courts? This volume assembles ten papers and comments that contain first steps in answering these questions. Their authors are legal scholars and economists, but also political scientists and philosophers. With this volume the Jahrbuch fur Neue Politische Okonomie has changed its title to Conferences on New Political Economy.
Price: £132.20
Pages: 374
Publisher: Mohr Siebeck
Imprint: Mohr Siebeck
Series: Conferences on New Political Economy
Publication Date:
22 February 2006
ISBN: 9783161487156
Format: Hardcover
BISACs:
Preface of the Editors - Stefan Voigt: Introduction - Daniel Sutter: The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court - Kai Ambos: Comment - Anne van Aaken: Making International Human Rights Protection More Effective: A Rational-Choice Approach to the Effectiveness of Provisions for Ius Standi - Stefan Oeter: Comment - Eric Neumayer: Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? - Lars P. Feld: Comment - Eric A. Posner: The Decline of the International Court of Justice - Gralf-Peter Calliess: Comment - Tom Ginsburg: International Judicial Lawmaking - Dieter Schmidtchen: Comment - Cesare P.R. Romano: International Courts and Tribunals: Price, Financing and Output - Wolfgang Kerber: Comment - Laurence R. Helfer: Why States Create International Tribunals: A Theory of Constrained Independence - Stefan Voigt: Comment - George Tridimas: The relevance of confederate structures in the judicial architecture of the Draft EU Constitution - Hans-Bernd Schafer: Comment - Justus Haucap, Florian Muller and Christian Wey: How to Reduce Conflicts Over International Antitrust? - Karl M. Meessen: Comment - Wilfried Hinsch and Markus Stepanians: International Justice and the Problem of Duty Allocation - Max Albert: Comment