Explores how major powers use persuasion and punishment to more or less effectively get states to reverse their nuclear weapons program.

Bribing the Bomb explores an important question for both international security and American foreign policy: What are the most effective combinations of carrots and sticks to get states to stop seeking nuclear weapons programs? How can major powers, particularly the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom (the P5), best influence this process? The majority of research in nuclear reversal either solely focuses on the United States as the state influencing other actors or focuses on individual cases of nuclear reversal. Building upon and expanding previous literature in nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence, E. Paige Reid explains how the alignment or divergence of P5 strategies condition the likelihood of nuclear reversal. She utilizes both a statistical analysis based on an original dataset and in-depth case studies—Kazakhstan, South Korea, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, Ukraine, Syria, and Iran—based on archival material to analyze a theory on concerted inducements. It is concluded that positive inducements—rewards, reassurance, and aid—work better than threats and punishments, especially when they come from trusted partners.