How do the anticompetitive effects of hybrid trading platforms and algorithmic collusion interact? And does classical EU competition law provide sufficient protection? In her analysis of the intersection between hybrid platforms and algorithmic collusion under EU competition law, Svenja Huemer demonstrates how platforms, in their dual role as both intermediaries and market participants, generate efficiencies while simultaneously exploiting information asymmetries and distorted incentives. She shows how the use of algorithms on hybrid platforms significantly reinforces these misaligned incentives. She focuses on two harm scenarios: the combination of platform- and algorithm-induced implicit collusion, and market tipping driven by data and network effects. On this basis, she examines the protective capacity of EU competition law de lege lata, in particular Article 101 TFEU and its accompanying Horizontal Guidelines, the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation, and the Vertical Guidelines. Finding these instruments insufficient, she expands her analysis to compliance approaches outside competition law and to recent EU digital and data regulation. As these newer instruments offer only marginal added value, she ultimately discusses and substantiates the revival of the New Competition Tool as a balanced approach to addressing both damage scenarios. Her study provides a clear analytical framework for assessing anticompetitive restrictions in the context of hybrid platforms and algorithmic systems. It identifies risks, highlights protection gaps, and outlines pathways towards a technologically neutral and practice-oriented modernization of EU competition law - one that balances the economic requirements of business conduct with the protection of market counterparts.